Macroprudential regulation of credit booms and busts : the experience of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia by Celeska, Frosina et al.
Policy Research Working Paper 5770
Macroprudential Regulation 
of Credit Booms and Busts
The Experience of the National Bank 





Europe and Central Asia Region 


















































































































dProduced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5770
This paper provides an overview of the macroprudential 
measures undertaken by the National Bank of the 
Republic of Macedonia to prevent further deterioration 
of the systemic risk and to promote resilience of the 
banking system. The measures were generally aimed at 
addressing the time dimension of the systemic risk and 
This paper is a product of the Office of the Chief Economist, Europe and Central Asia Region. It is part of a larger effort by 
the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around 
the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be 
contacted at CeleskaF@nbrm.mk, GligorovaV@nbrm.mk, and KrstevskaA@nbrm.mk.  
were intended to protect the banking system against the 
increase of credit risk arising from the credit boom. The 
paper also outlines the future challenges facing financial 
regulation and supervision, as well as the most important 
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Macroprudential Regulation of Credit Booms and Busts: The Experience of 




From 2004 to 2008, the economy registered the highest average real growth of gross 
domestic  product  (GDP)  in  the  country’s  overall  transition  period,  at  around  5  percent  per 
annum.  There has been both strong external demand for goods and services produced in the 
country  and  an  increase  in  domestic  demand.    In  2007  and  2008,  a  broad  set  of  indicators 
confirms that the economy was running above its potential.  One of the main driving forces of 
the domestic demand was the credit growth that was strongly accelerating in these years.  The 
credit growth in the banking system had intensified since 2004, somewhat later than in other, 
more advanced transition economies.  The share of total credits to the private sector to GDP in 
2000–2003 was relatively stable at around 15 percent, but grew continuously after that from 
around 20 percent in 2004 to around 40 percent in 2008.  This strong credit growth has been 
supported by combination of the following factors: 
1.  The  macroeconomic  environment  stabilized  after  some  external  and  internal 
noneconomic  shocks  in  1999  and  2001.    This  enabled  risk  reduction  and  positive 
expectations and therefore lower credit risk of the banks’ clients. 
2.  In line with positive expectations, there was an increase in the banks’ deposits, which 
became a main financing source of the banks'  business, thus enabling stronger credit 
growth. 
3.  The banking sector’s competitiveness was strengthened, especially after the entrance of 
foreign capital into the largest banks in the previous years, which led to a gradual decline 
of  the  lending  interest  rates  and  diversification  of  the  supply  of  credits  by  types, 
maturities, and conditions. 
4.  Finally, the intensified financial intermediation by the banking system was additionally 
supported  by  the  legislative  amendments  of  the  FX  legislation  in  2003,  which  had 
extended the ability to lend in foreign currency to all entities, including households, and 
not only to enterprises for payments abroad.    
 
The credit expansion in some ways coincided with the initial stage of the latest world 
economic  and  financial  crisis.    Therefore,  the  National  Bank  of  the  Republic  of  Macedonia 
(NBRM) faced a twofold challenge: on one side it had to protect the banking system from the 
adverse impacts of the excessive credit growth, and on the other side it had to avoid negative 
spillovers from the world financial crisis.  This paper discusses the measures that the NBRM 
undertook during the period of fast credit growth.  The first section of this paper outlines the 
analysis  of  the  financial  system  and  its  structural  features,  followed  by  the  analysis  of  the 
                                                            
1 This paper was prepared as background to a forthcoming World Bank report titled ―Golden Growth: Restoring the 
Lustre of the European Economic Model.‖ The paper’s findings, interpretations, and conclusions are entirely those 
of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, or 
NBRM, which is the central bank of the FYR Macedonia. It also does not represent the views of the World Bank 
and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they 
represent. All errors and omissions remain entirely the responsibility of the authors. The authors may be contacted at 
CeleskaF@nbrm.mk, GligorovaV@nbrm.mk, and KrstevskaA@nbrm.mk. 3 
 
macroeconomic environment and the monetary policy measures.  The second section focuses on 
the macroprudential measures undertaken by the NBRM and the future challenges the NBRM 
faces.  The last section summarizes the main conclusions and experiences from the utilization of 
the macroprudential measures and their impact on the banking system. 
 
I.  How Important Is the Financial Sector?  
А  stable  and  sound  financial  system  is  an  indispensable  prerequisite  for  a  country's 
macroeconomic stability.  Supporting the development of a sound and efficient financial system 
is part of the basic tasks of the NBRM.  The banking sector dominates the financial sector in the 
country,  which  is  under the direct  regulatory  and supervisory  authority of NBRM.   Yet  the 
responsibility for the safety and soundness of the overall financial system is shared with the other 
regulatory and supervisory bodies in the country.  
 
Main structural features of the financial sector 
One  of  the  main  structural  features  of  the  financial  system  is  its  relatively  simple 
structure, as evidenced by the type of financial institutions and the range of products and services 
offered (Table 1).   Pension  system reform,  developments  within the capital  market,  and  the 
entrance  of  foreign  strategic  investors  in  different  segments  of  the  financial  system  have 
increased the system’s diversification.  These factors have also promoted competition among 
both the same types as well as different types of financial institutions.  The structural changes 
within the financial system were accompanied by a significant increase in its size, leading to a 
continuous increase of financial intermediation.  
Nondepository  financial  institutions  have  a  relatively  small  role  in  the  financial 
intermediation, and their potential influence on financial stability is quite limited.  Nonetheless, a 
gradual  increase  of  their  significance  should  be  expected,  which  will  impose  the  need  for 
cautious monitoring of developments within this subsector.  Except for brokerage houses and 
investment fund management companies, nondepository financial institutions are predominantly 
foreign owned. 
A low level of intersectoral integration and limited cross-sectoral ownership among the 
separate financial segments are two of the main features of the financial sector.  They potentially 
limit the range of products and services offered.  However, on the upside this feature minimizes 
possible negative effects of contagion risk.  As noted, the banks are the "major players" within 
the financial architecture, and they influence the movements in the financial system to the largest 
extent. 
In  the  past  several  years  the  banking  system  has  undergone  a  process  of  substantial 
consolidation  as  well  as  a  period  of  significant  growth.    Several  mergers,  acquisitions, 
liquidations, and bankruptcy procedures reduced the number of depository institutions from 21 
banks  and  15  savings  houses  at  the  end  of  2004  to  17  banks  and  8  savings  houses  at  the 
beginning of 2011.
2  
                                                            
2 Due to an acquisition that took place in January 2011, the number of banks operating in the country dropped from 
the oft-reported 18 (at the end of 2010) to 17. 3 
 
 




                                                            
3 Source of data for all tables and charts: National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia (www.nbrm.mk). 
2005 2009 2010 2005 2009 2010 2005 2009 2010 2005 2009 2010
Depository financial institutions 142,391 271,825 308,265 89.7% 89.7% n.a. 34 28 26 48.3% 66.4% 72.7%
Banks 140,436 268,543 305,290 88.4% 88.6% n.a. 20 18 18 47.6% 65.6% 72.0%
Saving houses 1,955 3,283 2,975 1.2% 1.1% n.a. 14 10 8 0.7% 0.8% 0.7%
Nondepository financial institutions 16,427 31,347 n.a. 10.3% 10.3% n.a. 23 76 n.a. 5.6% 7.7% n.a.
Insurance companies 13,618 12,202 n.a. 8.6% 4.0% n.a. 10 13 n.a. 4.6% 3.0% n.a.
Insurance brokers n.f. n.a. n.a. n.f. n.a. n.a. n.f. 12 n.a. n.f. n.a. n.a.
Insurance agents n.f. n.a. n.a. n.f. n.a. n.a. n.f. 5 n.a. n.f. n.a. n.a.
Leasing companies 2,276 9,115 n.a. 1.4% 3.0% n.a. 2 9 n.a. 0.8% 2.2% n.a.
Pension funds n.f. 8,752 12,494 n.f. 2.9% n.a. n.f. 4 4 n.f. 2.1% 2.9%
Pension fund management companies 174 333 n.a. 0.1% 0.1% n.a. 2 2 2 0.1% 0.1% n.a.
Brokerage houses 359 754 n.a. 0.2% 0.2% n.a. 9 18 n.a. 0.1% 0.2% n.a.
Investment funds n.f. 152 n.a. n.f. 0.1% n.a. n.f. 8 n.a. n.f. 0.0% n.a.
Investment fund management companies n.f. 40 n.a. n.f. 0.01% n.a. n.f. 5 n.a. n.f. 0.01% n.a.
Private equity funds n.f. n.a. n.a. n.f. n.a. n.a. n.f. n.a. n.a. n.f. n.a. n.a.
Private equity fund management companies n.f. n.a. n.a. n.f. n.a. n.a. n.f. n.a. n.a. n.f. n.a. n.a.
Total 158,818 303,172 n.a. 100.0% 100.0% n.a. 57 104 n.a. 53.8% 74.1% n.a.
n.f.- not functioning
n.a. - not available
Type of financial institutions
Total assets (in millions of 
Denars)
Structure  Number of institutions Total assets / GDP 4 
 
 
These structural changes were accompanied by an extensive transformation of the 
ownership of banks.  The driving force of this transformation was the entrance of several 
new strategic investors: foreign financial institutions.  At the end of 2010, the number of 
foreign-owned  banks  was  15,
4  of which 9  were subsidiaries of foreign banks .
5    For 
comparison, at the end of 2004 the number of foreign-owned banks was eight, only four 
of which were subsidiaries of foreign banks.    At the end of 2010 ,  foreign capital 
accounted for 72.9 percent of the overall capital of the banking system (an increase of 
25.4 percentage points from the end of 2004
6).  Thus, at the end of 2010, foreign-owned 
banks hold 92.9 percent of total assets, 95.4 percent of total loans, and 95.8 percent of 
total  deposits  of  the  banking  system.     This  market  consolidation  and  ownership 
transformation is interesting in and of itself, but it should be viewed in a wider context, 
having in mind the benefits of the organizational and managerial changes that, in the long 
run, should increase the level of the stability and competitiveness of the overall banking 
system. 
In general, the shift to foreign ownership did not bring about major structural 
changes in the sources of financing of the banking system.  Most of the banks still tend to 
foster their growth primarily on domestic sources of financing: on deposits from residents 
(Chart 1 and Chart 2).  The orientation of banks toward domestic financing proved to be 
essential in maintaining the stability of the domest ic banking system in conditions o f 
global financial disruptions. 
 
Chart 1. Structure of banks' liabilities  Chart 2. The role of nonresidents in financing 
banks' activities 




                                                            
4 Foreign-owned banks are considered those where foreign shareholders own more than  50 percent of the 
total number of issued common shares.  
5 Subsidiaries of foreign banks are considered banks predominantly owned by foreign banks (more than 50 
percent of the total number of issued common shares in a bank is owned by а foreign bank). 
6 The biggest growth of the foreign capital share in the overall capital of the banking system was  registered 
in  2007 (13.0  percentage points),  followed by  2008  with  5.2  percentage points and  2005  with  5.0 
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The role of the banking system 
In the past several years, the banking system underwent significant transformation 
with regards to its market and ownership structure, the volume and array of its activities, 
and  its  performance.   These  changes enriched the spectrum  of products  and services 
offered,  expanded  the  banking  network,  and  stimulated  the  development  of  business 
practices  and  managerial  skills  in  the  banking  system.    Thus,  the  banking  system 
gradually but steadily has been strengthening its role as an economic life bloodstream, 
visibly developing its role and significance in the overall economy.  
Table 2. Growth of banks' assets versus GDP growth 
Indicator  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
Nominal annual growth rate of assets  12.5%  19.0%  24.0%  28.5%  12.1%  7.1%  13.7% 
Nominal annual growth rate of GDP  5.5%  8.3%  8.5%  14.0%  12.8%  -0.6%  3.6% 
Annual rate of inflation*  -0.4%  0.5%  3.2%  2.3%  8.3%  -0.8%  1.6% 
Real annual growth rate of assets**  13.0%  18.4%  20.1%  25.6%  3.5%  8.0%  11.9% 
Real annual growth rate of GDP  4.6%  4.4%  5.0%  6.1%  5.0%  -0.9%  0.7% 
Absolute value of the ratio between 
nominal annual growth rate of total assets 
and GDP 
2.29  2.30  2.83  2.03  0.94  11.15  3.79 
Absolute value of the ratio between real 
annual growth rate of total assets and GDP  2.82  4.19  4.03  4.19  0.70  8.87  17.04 
* Average, on cumulative basis (Consumer Price Index – CPI) 
** Calculated using the annual rate of inflation 
 




The growth of the level of financial intermediation confirms the increased role of 
the banking system in the overall economy (Table 2 and Chart 3).  The ratio of total 
banking system assets to GDP was 43.3 percent at the end of 2004 and rose to 72 percent 
at the end of 2010.  The increased level of financial intermediation is also evident through 
the continuous growth of the ratios of total loans and total deposits to GDP.  The ratio of 
total loans to GDP grew at a faster pace than did growth in deposits. Still, the ratio of 
total deposits to GDP is somewhat higher.  At the end of 2010 it reached 50.3 percent as 
opposed to the ratio of total loans to GDP of 44 percent.  Despite the dynamic growth 
over the past several years (with exception of 2008 and 2009, when the global financial 
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among banking systems with a relatively low degree of financial intermediation.
7  This is 
due to the sluggish growth in the first decade of the transition period , which, on a more 
positive note, created the potential for the subsequent acceleration of the growth of the 
banking system (Chart 4).  
 




In spite of the faster growth of credit support to households (particularly until 
2008), loans to the corporate sector still constitute the largest share of total loans to the 
nonfinancial sector (Chart 5 and Chart 6).  At all times during the past several years, 
loans to corporations formed above 60 percent of total loans, while the highest share of 
loans  to  households  was  39.5  percent,  in  2008.    The  share  of  loans  to  other  clients 
(nonresidents, the state, and so forth) is an insignificant part of the overall credit portfolio 
to nonfinancial entities (below 1 percent).   
Chart 5. Sectoral structure of total loans  Chart 6. Annual growth of loans by sector 
   
Source: NBRM 
                                                            
7 More detailed comparisons of the banking  system of this country with the banking systems of other 
countries can be found in the Annual Reports on the banking system and the bank supervision on NBRM 
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Table 3. Total credit exposure by activities and by credit products 
 
 
Sectors Type of product / activity 
Credit exposure as 






Share in annual 
growth of total 
credit exposure
Housing loans 17,066 2,180 14.6% 40.0%
Consumer loans 28,461 3,333 13.3% 61.1%
Overdrafts 9,252 798 9.4% 14.6%
Credit cards 23,147 -302 -1.3% -5.5%
Auto loans 4,219 -486 -10.3% -8.9%
Other loans 1,124 -69 -5.8% -1.3%
83,269 5,454 7.0% 13.7%
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 4,329 74 1.8% 0.7%
Industry 49,948 1,493 3.1% 13.5%
Construction 15,423 1,297 9.2% 11.7%
Wholesale and retail 44,752 3,737 9.1% 33.8%
Transport, storage, information and 
comunication
10,860 2,922 36.8% 26.4%
Accommodation and catering 3,698 -97 -2.6% -0.9%
Real estate, professional, science and 
technical activities and administrative 
service activities
8,216 1,124 15.9% 10.2%
Other activities 4,049 496 14.0% 4.5%
141,274 11,047 8.5% 27.8%






Note: Total credit exposure includes exposures to natural persons, corporates and other clients. The amount of credit exposures to other clients is 
not separately shown in the table8 
 
 
Within the corporate sector, the highest share of total credit exposure is to industrial firms 
(Table 3).  At the end of 2010, this credit exposure was 35.4 percent of the total credit exposure 
to the corporate sector and 15.8 percent of the total credit exposure to all sectors (financial and 
nonfinancial).  Credit support to wholesale and retail firms, at 31.7 percent, holds the second 
largest share in the total credit exposure to the corporate sector.  Most of the credit support to 
households is channeled through consumer loans, which alone constituted 34.2 percent of the 
overall credit exposure to this sector at the end of 2010.  The other types of loans that are 
generally  used  for  consumer  purposes  (overdrafts  and  credit  cards)  jointly  account  for  38.9 
percent of the overall credit exposure to households.  Housing loans still form a relatively small 
part of the credit portfolio of households: 20.5 percent as of December 31, 2010.  
 
The role of the capital market 
The gradual  increase of trading and price levels  on the Macedonian Stock Exchange 
(MSE) began at the end of 2005 (Chart 7).  The largest activity on the secondary capital market 
occurred  in  2007,  when  the  turnover  on  the  stock  exchange  realized  by  classic  trading  was 
almost equal to the overall turnover realized in all other years in the period from 2005 to 2010 
(except 2007).  The growth of capital market turnover in the period 2005-2007 was mostly an 
outcome of the increased interest for trading of shares on the stock exchange, above all on the 
part  of  foreign  institutional  investors  (mostly  on  the  purchase  side  of  the  stock  exchange 
turnover), but also on the part of the local public (particularly natural persons).  This increase in 
trading was accompanied by a gradual growth of price levels on the MSE.  One could even talk 
about a possible presence of a ―price bubble‖ during 2007, when the  MSE Index (MBI-10) 
reached a level 10 times higher than its basic value.
8  The growth of prices resulted in an increase 
of total market capitalization of listed shares and bonds, which reached its maximum in 2007 and 
represented 84.7 percent of GDP.  However, since the last quarter of 2007, with the first signs of 
the world economic crisis and the increased inflationary pressures worldwide, there was a trend 
of constant decrease of the stock exchange turnover, increased trading restraint of potential 
investors,  and  outflow  of  foreign  investors’  funds.    Price  levels  on  the  MSE  registered  a 
significant  downward correction during 2008 and mild but  rather variable and unpredictable 
growth in the course of 2009 and 2010.  Market capitalization of shares and bonds showed a 
significant drop, and at the end of 2010 was reduced to a level of 31.9 percent of GDP (as 
opposed to the ratio of banking system assets to GDP of 71.2 percent).  If bonds are excluded, 
market capitalization is just 28.9 percent of GDP.  
                                                            
8 The MBI-10 index was introduced as of January 4, 2005, when the basic value was set to 1.000 index points. 9 
 




Macroeconomic environment and monetary policy measures  
From 2004 until  2008, monetary policy went  through several  stages,  accommodating 
changes  in  the  macroeconomic  environment  and  preserving  price  stability  through  the 
maintenance of exchange rate stability.  
From the beginning of 2004 to September 2005, the monetary policy was conducted in 
conditions of growing deficit on the current account.  In 2004 there was a more intensive growth 
of the domestic demand and export.  Considering the high import component, the increased 
domestic export created higher import pressures.  These developments contributed to significant 
widening of the current account deficit, from 4.1 percent of GDP in 2003 to 8.4 percent of the 
GDP in 2004.  At the same time, the acceleration of the credit activities and the sharp deepening 
of the financial intermediation provided for additional financial support to the economy.  
Unfavorable trends on the foreign exchange market, estimates on further aggravation of 
the current account position, and uncertainty about capital inflow dynamics required tightening 
of the monetary policy.  This was also suggested by the relative indicators on foreign reserves, 
which were not favorable. In 2004, the reserves covered less than three months of the next year's 
imports of goods and services, indicating a need to increase the foreign reserves level.  In such 
an environment, despite low inflation, a monetary policy response was necessary.  It was aimed 
at  relaxing  the  pressure  on  the  current  account  and  increasing  the  capacity  to  sustain  the 
exchange rate stability.  The Central Bank bills (CB bills) interest rate, as the main interest rate, 
generally had an upward trend and its cumulative growth was around 4 percentage points in this 
period.  In February 2004 there was a shift in the type of the CB bills auctions, from ―interest 
rates tender‖ to ―volume tender,‖ with the latter having better signaling features.  At the same 
time, in order to prevent additional pressure on the foreign exchange market, the portfolio of the 
NBRM instruments throughout which the excess of liquidity can be absorbed was expanded by 
the introduction of CB bills with 7-day maturity, besides the CB bills with 28-day maturity.  In 
addition to the increase of the main interest rate, the bank's reserve requirements were increased, 
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deposits.    This  measure  was  undertaken  in  order  to  reduce  part  of  the  structural  excess  of 
liquidity. 
From the end of 2005 until the end of 2007, the flows in the balance of payments enabled 
accumulation of foreign reserves, creating space for continual monetary policy easing.  Despite 
the high trade deficit, the significant growth of private transfer inflows enabled a narrowing of 
the current account deficit (excluding 2007).   The continuity of a stable environment was  a 
crucial factor that contributed to a significant increase of the foreign inflows through private 
transfers in this period.  The private transfer inflows were gradually canalized as savings within 
the banking system.  Another important characteristic for this period is the intensification of 
private capital inflows, especially more intensive foreign direct investments in the private sector.  
This  process  started  in  2007,  which  was  relatively  late  compared  to  the  other  transitional 
economies.  In addition, the portfolio investments of the foreign investors on the MSE were also 
significantly intensified in these three years.  It should be emphasized that by the end of 2007, 
there was a certain degree of liberalization of the portfolio investments.
9  In 2005, high inflows 
in the capital account were registered based on government borrowing on international capital 
market. In accordance with these flows, there was continuous purchase of foreign currencies by 
the NBRM on the foreign exchange market.  
At  the  end  of  2005,  as  foreign  currency  inflows  and  liquidity  were  growing,  the 
appropriate monetary policy changes were undertaken.   In October 2005, the  CB bill auctions 
were reversed to ―interest rates tender‖ auctions.  In such an environment of excess of liquidity, 
the interest for investments in CB bills was high, which allowed continuous reduction of the 
main interest rate.  Thereby, the interest rate had a downward trend, recording a cumulative fall 
of around 5 percentage points in this three-year period.  Banking credit activities in this period 
were accelerating, resulting into fast financial deepening.  Although these trends were translated 
into higher imports, these imports were largely alleviated by the export performances.  Besides 
the intensive growth of the economy over potential, and new capital inflows, inflation remained 
low and inflation expectations were stable.  
From the end of 2007 until the end of 2009, the monetary policy was tightened.  At the 
end of 2007, strong inflationary pressures started to emerge, caused by the price shock on the 
world food and energy market.   The combination of relatively strong domestic demand and 
aggravated  terms  of  trade  contributed  to  expansion  of  the  trade  deficit.    The  inflationary 
pressures worsened the expectations, which created pressure on the foreign currency demand and 
caused reduction of the private transfers.  This contributed to expansion of the current account 
deficit, which in conditions of insufficient capital inflows increased the external vulnerability of 
the economy.  
In February 2008 the NBRM changed the layout of CB bills auctions from ―interest rates 
tender‖ toward ―volume tender.‖  Simultaneously, the NBRM decided to increase the CB bill 
interest  rate from  5.08  percent,  which was  the  rate at the last  auction  before the  change of 
tenders, to 5.25 percent.  Additional interest rate increases were made in March and May 2008 
and the interest rate reached 7 percent.  With rising inflation and estimations for significant 
                                                            
9 The so-called foreign exchange rights for the banks dealing with portfolio investors were abolished.  Before, the 
banks had to buy these rights from the NBRM; they were a kind of "bookings" for the future foreign exchange  
outflows from the foreign reserves, in cases when it was expected that the investments would outflow in a period 
shorter than one year.  The price of these rights was linked to the main interest rate and the interest rates in the euro 
zone.  The aim of this measure was to discourage the short term foreign capital fluctuations on the domestic market.    11 
 
expansion of the current account deficit, one of the biggest challenges for the NBRM in that 
period was the strong credit activity growth, particularly of the credits to households.
10  
In the last quarter of 2008, the spillover effects of the global economic and financial crisis 
started to influence the domestic economy strongly, mainly through exports and the expectations 
channel.    The  emergence  and  escalation  of  the  global  crisis  reduced  inflation  but  increased 
uncertainty and risk and influenced the balance of payments through a decrease of exports and a 
slowdown of capital flows.  The latter created great pressure on the foreign exchange market. In 
order to maintain the stability of the exchange rate and prices, the NBRM intervened by a net 
sale of foreign currencies.  
At the beginning of 2009, the external position of the economy deteriorated further, as 
exports significantly decreased while imports did not adjust, as domestic demand was still quite 
robust.    The  expectations  continued  to  aggravate  markets,  which  resulted  in  increased 
preferences for foreign currency instruments.  In addition, although there was no ―sudden stop‖ 
syndrome, the amount of capital inflows considerably decreased compared to the previous year.  
This  combination  of  unfavorable  factors  caused  strong  pressures  on  the  domestic  currency, 
which was a reason for the NBRM continuing to intervene in the first five months of the year 
through net sales of foreign currencies.  The decline of foreign reserves and the estimates for 
unfavorable future trends in the external sector, conditioned by the global recovery, imposed a 
clear need for monetary contraction.  The NBRM increased the main interest rate from 7 percent 
to 9 percent in March 2009.  As a response to the rising euroization of the deposit base, in May 
2009 the NBRM  had increased  banks’ reserve requirements  rate for deposits  with  a  foreign 
currency (FX) component.  This requirement came into force in July 2009 and increased of the 
rate  on  banks’  FX  liabilities  from  10  percent  to  11.5  percent  and  the  rate  on  liabilities  in 
domestic currency with FX clause from 10 percent to 20 percent.  In August 2009 the rate of 
banks’ FX liabilities rose from 11.5 percent to 13 percent.   
As a result of the monetary measures undertaken, as well as of more positive and less 
uncertain  forecasts  about  the  world  economy,  a  significant  stabilization  of  expectations  was 
registered in  the second half of 2009 and throughout  2010.   This  enabled strong  growth of 
private transfers.  On the other hand, the domestic demand remained weak.  During the slow 
recovery of funding sources and remaining perceptions of risks, the credit support by the banks 
was considerably reduced—credit growth fell to 3.5 percent in 2009 from 34 percent in 2008.  
Therefore, the import market started to adjust faster, allowing annual trade deficit reduction as of 
the second quarter of 2009.  In the second half of 2009 there was a gradual improvement of the 
global environment, which contributed to a modest recovery of the export market sparked by 
growth of demand and export prices.  In such conditions, there was a decrease of the current 
account deficit from 12.8 percent of GDP in 2008 to 6.7 percent of GDP in 2009.  At the same 
time,  high  inflows  into  foreign  reserves  were  registered  through  external  borrowing  by  the 
government.  These changes increased the foreign currency supply, allowing the purchase of 
foreign currencies by the NBRM and the replenishment of foreign reserves in the second half of 
2009.  The positive trends in the second half of the year exceeded expectations, which along with 
the estimates on a stable external position in the upcoming period provided an opportunity to 
relax the monetary policy (Chart 8).  At the end of November 2009, the main interest rate of the 
NBRM was decreased by 0.5 percentage points. 
                                                            




Chart 8. Central Bank bills rate and transactions with banks on the foreign exchange market 
 
Source: NBRM 
The  process  of  monetary  policy  relaxation  continued  in  2010.    The  NBRM’s  main 
interest rate in this period was reduced seven times, thus bringing it to a historically low level of 
4 percent in December 2010.  The accommodative monetary policy stance in this period arose 
from  the  improvements  in  the  macroeconomic  environment.    In  2010,  there  was  a  gradual 
recovery of economic activity.  The current account deficit in 2010 was 2.8 percent of GDP, 
which represented a significant downward change for two years in a row.  Although the capital 
inflows during 2010 were relatively lower than  the  year before, considering the low current 
deficit they were sufficient to enable further increases in the foreign exchange reserves.  At the 
end of 2010 at a level of 1.715 million euros, the foreign reserves exceeded the pre-crisis level 
(Chart 9), and at the same time covering around four months of goods and services for the next 
year. 
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Considering the fact that monetary policy measures in the analyzed period were mainly 
conducted through changes of the main interest rate, it is important to explain some features of 
the interest rate transmission channel.  The transmission mechanism of monetary policy through 
the interest rate channel has been traditionally very weak,
11 although some improvements in the 
more  recent  years of  the  transition  period are  not able.    When  analyzing  the interest  rate 
transmission channel, one should keep in mind that the banking system is in a position of excess 
liquidity: banks do not borrow from the central bank but invest in its short-term securities.  In the 
past couple of years, banking competition has proven to be a very important factor in the banks’ 
interest rates, and it resulted in a declining trend of the lending interest rates—and in some years 
an increase in the deposit interest rates.  The banks’ interest rate spread went down on average 
from around 6.0 percent in 2004, to around 4.0 percent in 2008, and to 2.4 percent in 2010 (Chart 
10).  
Chart 10. Average lending and deposit-taking interest rates   
 
Source: NBRM 
Historically, the pass-through effect seems to be stronger when there is a declining trend 
of the NBRM interest rate.  The opposite direction of the main monetary policy rate, the increase 
in 2004, was not followed by the banks (see Chart 11).  The downward trend of the banks' 
interest rates in 2004 was due mainly to the higher competitiveness in the banking system, the 
further  enhancement  of  the  banks'  deposits,  the  improvement  of  the  banks'  credit  portfolio 
quality, and higher efficiency in the banks' operation in that period.  In 2008, monetary policy 
was tightening, the banks' lending interest rates remained almost unchanged, and the deposits 
interest rates were increasing in order to attract additional sources after low deposit growth at the 
initial stage of the world crisis.  In 2009, the tightening of the monetary policy was only partially 
followed by the banks' interest rates.  Like in 2008, the stronger reaction was again shown by the 
increase of deposit interest rates (by 1.2 percent) relative to the increase of the average lending 
interest rate (by 0.4 percent).  In both years, the banks were reducing the interest rate spread, 
                                                            
11 Different analyses within the NBRM for different analyzed periods have shown that only 2 to 10 p ercent of the 
main monetary policy interest rate change was transmitted over average lending interest rates on the banks' denar 
credits, in the same month or with a one month time lag. The accommodation of the short -run dynamics of the 
banks' lending interest rates to their long-term equilibrium usually is slow. 
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Average interest rate on denar deposits (in %, on annual basis)14 
 
rather than worsening the credit conditions, striving to maintain relationships with good clients 
and preserve the propensity to save during the crisis period.  




II.  Macroprudential Regulations 
This section focuses on the macroprudential measures undertaken by the NBRM from 
2004 to 2010.  This seven-year time horizon encompasses the pre-crisis period (2004–2007), the 
crisis period (2008–2009), and the post-crisis period (2010).  Within this period, the NBRM 
undertook four measures that have a macroprudential nature and were aimed (i) at reducing the 
systemic risk arising from the growth of the balance sheets and the risk-taking by banks and (ii) 
at enabling stable supply of banking services to the real economy:
12 
1.  Regulation on foreign exchange lending 
2.  Amendments to the capital adequacy framework
13 
3.  Prevention of high credit growth risk 
4.  Introduction of liquidity ratios 
 
The  four  tools  used  by  the  NBRM  are  microprudential  instruments  in  their  essence, 
recalibrated to limit the systemic risk and to promote resilience of the banking system.  The main 
purpose of the employed instruments was to address the amplification of the banking-system-
wide risk by the interactions with the real economy.  Even though it is difficult to draw a clear 
line connecting the four instruments, most of them are price-based tools, intended to protect the 
banking system against buildup of credit risk due to high credit growth.  
In addition to the above-mentioned measures, in the precrisis and the crisis period the 
NBRM exploited a number of other tools that had certain macroprudential benefits.  These tools, 
such as the monetary policy instruments (official interest rates, foreign market interventions, and 
reserve requirements), which were explained in more details in section   I, other tools that are not 
                                                            
12 The measures are listed chronologically, depending on the time of their introduction. 
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typically  prudential  in  their  nature,
14  or  the  discretionary warnings on the elevation of risk 
articulated in  NBRM speeches or  publications (e.g. Financial Stability Reports) are excluded 
from the focus of the following analysis. 
 
Regulation on FX lending 
As with many other emerging markets and small economies, the presence of foreign 
currency in the everyday operation of individual business entities is  considerably high.   The 
banking system is not an exception  to this pattern.  The lending and deposit-taking in foreign 
currency are highly present in the banks’ balance sheets.  Looking at the data from 2004 to 2006, 
the share of FX lending
15 has grown by 15.7 percentage points (Chart 12).
16  At the end of 2006, 
for the first time the share of these loans was higher than the share of the denar loans.  




Despite the growth of the FX lending, the banking system was still among the systems 
with moderate participation in FX lending.
17  However, the recorded growth triggered the so-
called  induced  credit  risk,  a  credit  risk  arising  from  the  clients’  imbalances  in  the  currency 
structure of their inflows and outflows. In order to address this growing risk, in 2006 the NBRM 
issued a decision on the conditions and the manner of extending FX loans and denar loans with 
FX clauses.
18  The decision regulates the conditions under which banks can extend FX loans and 
                                                            
14 In January 2009, in light of unstable developments on the international financial markets and increasing risks, the 
NBRM launched auctions of FX deposits of the banks. The implementation of this measure started in February 2009 
through auctions conducted by applying volume tenders, for unlimited amounts of FX deposits with maturity of 1, 3, 
6, and 12 months. The interest rates of the FX deposits are equal to the interest rates of the funds placed on the 
international financial markets. 
15 The FX lending encompasses both FX loans and denar loans with FX clauses. 
16 The liberalization of FX legislation in 2003 supported the rise of the FX lending. 
17 As a comparison, the share of FX lending in some of the Baltic countries in 2005 was above 70 percent. 
18 The decision was not the first regulation of this kind. In 2003 the NBRM had adopted a similar FX regulation, 
which encompassed only the FX loans. 
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denar loans with FX clauses (the so-called FX indexed loans).  The conditions are identical for 
both types of loans. Banks can extend these loans only if 
1.  the client is classified as ―A‖ or ―B‖
19 client by the bank and by the banking system (as 
reported within the NBRM’s Credit Registry
20), or 
2.  the claim is covered with first-rated collateral.
21 
In addition to these requirements, the decision requires banks to have written policies and 
procedures for the management of the induced credit risk .  These internal acts should include, 
inter alia: 
1.  criteria for assessment of the (mis)match of clients’ FX assets and liabilities, 
2.  FX exposure limits, and 
3.  regular stress testing of the FX risk (at least on annual basis). 
 
These requirements are not intended to limit FX lending but to enhance its quality, thus 
reducing the induced credit risk.  As a result, the deterioration of the quality of the overall credit 
portfolio experienced in the previous years was less apparent within the FX credit portfolio.  In 
the past two  years (end of 2010 compared to end of 2008), the share of A‖ and ―B‖ credit 
exposures to households and enterprises in the total credit exposure decreased by 2.9 percent,
22 
while the share of FX credit exposure s to households and enterprises classified in these risk 
categories decreased by 1.5 percent.  
 
Prevention of high credit-growth risk and reduction of the credit risk arising from certain credit 
exposures 
In a favorable macroeconomic climate (2004–2007), the banking system has experienced 
a substantial credit growth, reaching an annual growth rate of 39 percent at the end of 2007 (or an 
average annual growth rate for the three years of 27 percent).  Even though these growth rates 
were mainly a result of the low starting base of the banks’ lending activities in the previous years, 
the intensive growth was close to crossing from a sustainable credit growth to a credit boom 
(Chart  4).    The  intensive  credit  growth  was  particularly  notable  in  the  banks’  lending  to 
households.
23  The loans to this sector experienced considerably higher annual growth rates (58.8 
percent at the end of the first quarter of 2008)  compared to the growth of loans to enterprises, 
which had reached 33.5 percent at the end of the same period  (Chart 6).  The more dynamic 
growth  was  a compensation for the low  level of lending activities   typical for the period of 
transition, when banks generally restrained from granting loans to households.  In 2004–2007, the 
                                                            
19 According to the decision on credit risk management, an ―A‖ or ―B‖ client is a client that pays its loan obligations 
as they fall due, or with insignificant delays, and that has solid credit history. 
20 The NBRM Credit Registry is a public-type credit registry that collects data from the domestic banks and saving 
houses on credit exposures higher than: 
-  For banks: denar 300,000 (almost euro 5,000) for legal entities and denar 5,000 (euro 82) for natural persons 
-  For saving houses: denar 50,000 (euro 820) for legal entities and denar 5.000 (euro 82) for natural persons. 
21 During the analyzed period, the first-rated collateral included cash and cash-equivalents; guaranties and securities 
issued by the  country, the NBRM, central banks, and the governments of EU m ember-states, the United States, 
Switzerland, Japan, Canada, Australia and Norway; guaranties by first -rated banks; etc (in June 2011, there were 
certain amendments to this definition). 
22 Including the small traders but excluding the financial institutions and the government. 
23 The lending to households includes loans to small traders. 17 
 
average growth rate of loans to households was almost 30 percentage points higher than the 
average growth of the loans to enterprises.  
The composition of the credit growth to households according to the type of the credit 
exposure illustrates an asymmetrical growth of the different credit products.  The annual growth 
of exposure from credit cards and overdrafts to households was especially high and in some 
periods  it  reached  almost  200  percent  (Chart  13).    The  growth  of  these  credit  products 
contributed by more than half to the total credit growth of loans to households.  As a result, at the 
end of the first quarter of 2008, the exposures from credit cards and overdrafts reached their peak 
(39.5 percent of the total banks’ credit portfolio to households). 
 





In addition, this credit growth was followed by a deterioration of the overall credit quality 
of loans to households, which was particularly emphasized at the end of 2006 and throughout 
2007.  The analysis of the so-called old credit portfolio, that is, exclusion of the impact of the 
new  loans  granted  to  households  during  the  period  of  September  2006  to  September  2007, 
confirms the deterioration of the credit quality.  For the duration of this period, the share of 
exposures to households classified in risk categories ―C‖, ―D,‖ and ―E‖ (categories with a higher 
credit risk) rose from 4.9 percent to 8.5 percent.  In contrast, the deterioration of the credit quality 
of the loans to enterprises was less evident.
24  Once more, the exposures from credit cards and 
overdrafts recorded the highest decline of their credit quality.   If analyzed through the same 
indicator, the share of ―C‖, ―D,‖ and ―E‖ exposures in the total amount of exposures from credit 
cards and overdrafts increased by more than 109 percent, annually.  Their increase factored the 
annual growth of the total "C", "D," and "E" exposures to households by almost 40 percent.  
There are several reasons for the decline of the credit quality of exposures from credit 
cards and overdrafts.  First of all, they were relatively new products on the domestic financial 
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market.  Their features and advantages had provided banks with additional and relatively stable 
income source, which had increased the banks’ competition.  As a result, banks started to lessen 
the conditions for granting loans.  In addition, more than 75 percent of the exposures arising 
from credit cards and overdrafts were unsecured claims.  Hence, in an environment of advanced 
credit growth, coupled with lessening of the credit standards and inadequate collateral coverage, 
it was evident that the exposure from credit cards and overdrafts bore more risk than all other 
credit products to households.  Moreover, the fact that it was a relatively new credit portfolio 
with a higher risk for further deterioration of the credit quality as a result of its aging, has 
additionally increased the NBRM’s concerns on the possible negative impact that this credit 
portfolio might have on the whole banking system.  
To address this potential problem, in the first half of 2008 the NBRM introduced two 
measures: higher risk weights for exposure from credit cards and overdrafts (amendments to the 
capital adequacy framework) and the introduction of acceptable growth rates for the total loans to 
households.  These measures had similar goals: to discourage the excessive credit growth of the 
loans to households and to reduce the higher credit risk associated with some of these loans.  In 
addition, these measures, along with other measures undertaken by the NBRM in that period, 
were aimed at lessening of the inflationary pressures coming from the demand side. 
 
Amendments to the capital adequacy framework 
With the first indications of the credit quality deterioration, in March 2008, the NBRM 
Council adopted amendments to the Decision on the methodology for determining the capital 
adequacy.  These amendments introduced a new, higher risk weight (125 percent) for banks’ 
claims from households arising from approved and used overdrafts and credit cards.  The new 
risk weight was applied to both on-balance and off-balance sheet items (after the use of the credit 
conversation factor).
25  With the enlarged risk weight,  the NBRM has sent a clear signal to the 
banks on the level of risk associated with the exposures from overdrafts and credit cards. 
The  rationale  behind the  introduction  of this particular  measure  was three-fold:  (i) it 
requires additional amount of own funds as a buffer for the growing risks; (ii) the higher capital 
requirement forces banks to enhance their capital position, which  in return reduces the credit 
growth risk to an acceptable level ; and (iii) it is a system-wide measure applied to all banks, 
which gives an additional prudential advantage to the measure. 
As a result, in the following period banks had  implemented more conservative lending 
approaches,  which  enabled  substantial  reduction  of  the  credit  growth  of  exposures  from 
overdrafts and credit cards (Chart 14).  In the quarter following the introduction of the measure, 
their strong credit growth was immediately decelerated and experienced a drop of 17 percentage 
points,  which  is  the  strongest  slowdown in  the  entire  period after the  introduction  of  the 
measures.
26  As a comparison, in the period of 10 quarters before the introduction of the measure 
(September 2005 to March 2008), the exposures from overdrafts and credit cards increased by 
279 percent and 1,127 percent, respectively.  In the following 10 quarters after March 2008, their 
growth was considerably reduced (45.6 percent for overdrafts and 13.6 percent for credit cards).  
                                                            
25 Following international standards, the off -balance sheet items are converted to on -balance sheet exposures by 
using credit conservation factors (CCFs). The CCFs for the potential exposures arising from unused overdrafts and 
credit cards are (1) 20 percent for potential exposures with maturity up to one year and (2) 50 percent for potential 
exposures with maturity above one year. 
26 In the same quarter, all other exposures to households had continued to grow. 19 
 
At the same time, the capital adequacy ratio has experienced a slight, but important growth of 1.1 
percentage point.  
 





Prevention of high credit-growth risk 
The  second  measure  that  had  reflected  the  credit  growth  of  loans  to  households  was 
introduced by the NBRM in June, 2008, with the adoption of the decision on the compulsory 
deposit with the NBRM.  This decision defined the acceptable cumulative growth rates of loans 
to households with monthly dynamics for the rest of 2008, while in December 2008, the NBRM 
issued another Decision intended to cover the growth rates for 2009.  With these two decisions, 
the annual growth rates of loans to households were projected at 39.8 percent, for the end of 2008 
and 11.3 percent for the end of 2009. 
Whenever a bank’s growth of loans to households was above the acceptable monthly rate, 
the bank was required to deposit with the NBRM an amount of funds equal to the achieved 
excess.  The difference between the acceptable growth and the achieved growth constituted the 
compulsory deposit with the NBRM, on which NBRM paid an interest of 1 percent per annum.  
This measure could not be regarded as a pure quantitative limitation of the credit growth.  
Banks were allowed to have higher credit growths than the rates prescribed with both decisions.  
However,  the  measure  had  made  the  higher  credit  growth  more  costly  for  the  banks.    The 
requirement for a compulsory deposit was an attempt to sterilize  a certain amount of banks’ 
funds, which could not be used for other purposes, including lending activities to households.  
The measure had one additional intention—to prevent the possibility of a credit growth transfer, 
from  the  exposures  from  credit  cards  and  overdrafts  to  other  similar  types  of  exposures  to 
households (for example, consumer loans).  The possibility for this transfer became visible with 
the introduction of the previous measure—the requirement for higher risk weights on exposures 
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During the period of the effectiveness of this measure,  only one bank was constantly 
within the prescribed monthly rates.  On average, seven banks were above the acceptable growth 
rates,  per  month.    The  average  excess  during  the  period  of  one  and  a  half  years  was  3.88 
percentage points above the acceptable growth rates, with the highest excess in the whole period 
was 70.8 percentage points.  However, it should be pointed out that these excesses were more 
frequent in the first several months after the introduction of the measure.  Even though there were 
still banks that were above the monthly rates,
27 the achieved annual growth rate on loans to 
households for 2008 was 37.4 percent, which was 2.4 percentage points  below the acceptable 
maximum.  This trend continued in 2009, which was clear proof that the measure had served its 
purpose. 
After the introduction of the measure there was a significant decline in the growth of the 
loans to households, from almost 60 percent at the beginning of 2008 to 5.7 percent at the end of 
2010, or a decline of more than 90 percent (Chart 15).  





The fourth measure that was  introduced by  the NBRM  was  intended to enhance the 
liquidity position of banks.  In general, banks had a prudential and conservative approach to 
liquidity risk management in the pre-crisis period, which enabled them to accumulate adequate 
levels of liquid assets to address the challenges that emerged during the crisis period.  However, 
the global financial turbulence and the contraction of the international capital flows had certain 
impacts on the banks’ liquidity, which resulted in a decline of the growth of the liquid assets in 
2008 (Chart 16).  
The expectations were that the impact of the international financial and economic crisis 
over the economy could accelerate in the following period.  Therefore, there was a necessity to 
                                                            
27 At the end of 2008, there were six banks that were above the prescribed monthly rates, which was one of the 
reasons why the NBRM decided to extend the use of this measure for 2009 (in addition to the fact that the risk from 
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improve  banks’  liquidity-risk-management  systems  and  to  strengthen  their  liquidity  position, 
which was achieved through the adoption of the decision on liquidity risk management at the end 
of 2008.
28  




This decision quantifies the adequate level of liquidity of banks in the banking system.  
Banks  are  required  to  adhere  to  two  liquidity  ratios  of  assets  and  liabilities  maturing  in  the 
following  30  and  180  days  (LR30  and  LR180).    Both  ratios  are  calculated  and  maintained 
separately for assets and liabilities in domestic and in foreign currency, and should be at least 
equal to one.  Assets and liabilities are slotted into maturity buckets up to 30 days and up to 180 
days, according to their residual maturity,  that is, according to the remaining period to their 
contractual maturity.  
The decision allows for a special treatment of the monetary policy instruments of the 
NBRM and the sight deposits and transaction accounts with banks: 
1.  The instruments of the NBRM (excluding the foreign currency reserve requirement) are 
included in the calculation of the liquidity ratios, regardless of their maturity and currency.  
Banks  have  an  option  to  choose  whether  they  will  use  the  NBRM’s  instruments  for 
achieving the required liquidity ratio in domestic currency or in foreign currency (but not 
for both ratios).  This option was introduced in May 2009 and was effective until March 
2011.  In February 2011, the NBRM introduced a new instrument for the banks,
29 a six-
                                                            
28 A similar regulation was adopted in previous years, but it was mainly of a qualitative na ture—it had defined the 
qualitative requirements for adequate liquidity risk management. 
29  A  denar deposit with the NBRM, with a six months maturity and an interest rate equal to the six -month 
EURIBOR plus 0.5 percentage points.  The early withdrawal of th e deposit is allowed.  The option given to the 
banks to use this instrument for achieving the denar or FX liquidity ratios should increase its attractiveness, thus 
stimulating banks to transform part of their CB bills investments into this instrument. In t his way, the remaining 
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month deposit with the NBRM.  With its adoption, the previous broad option was limited 
only to this new instrument. 
2.  For the sight deposits and transaction accounts, the decision defines a minimum amount of 
these funds that should be covered with an appropriate level of liquid assets.  Banks are 
required to have a coverage ratio of at least 30 percent of the sight deposits and transaction 
accounts.  In addition, banks that have higher concentration levels within these sources of 
funds are required to secure higher coverage ratios.  The concentration level is measured 
through the share of the 20 largest holders of transaction accounts and sight deposits in the 
total amount of transaction accounts and sight deposits.  Whenever this level is higher than 
30 percent, banks have to adhere to higher coverage ratios.
30  
With the two liquidity ratios, the NBRM has provided banks with an appropriate dynamic 
for achieving the prescribed minimum.  The dynamic for LR30 ended in February 2011, while 
the dynamic for the liquidity ratio with the longer time-horizon will end in February 2014.   
At the end of 2010, all banks had  LR30 greater than one, both for positions  in domestic 
currency and positions in foreign currency, while the weighted average of LR30 of the whole 
banking system was 1.5 (for both positions).   For LR180, most of the banks are  within the 
prescribed dynamic or have already achieved the minimum level  of liquidity.
31  Only two banks 
have LR180 for positions in foreign currency lower than the prescribed dynamic, and these banks 
have presented the NBRM a plan for achieving the required liquidity level.  
As a result, at the end of 2010 liquid assets are at their highest level in the six years (Chart 
16).  The share of  the highly liquid assets  increased by 226 percent (compared to  the end of 
2004),  due  mainly to the  amplified  investments in NBRM bills and government securities.   
Keeping in mind the weighted averages of the prescribed liquidity ratios that at the end of 2010 
were slightly above the minimum, it could be verified that the buildup of the highly liquid assets 
was aimed mostly at achieving that minimum.  The growth of the liquid assets has bestowed a 
considerable boost of the liquid-to-total assets ratio of more than 52 percent from its lowest level 
at the end of the first quarter of 2009, the first period when banks had to adhere to the prescribed 
dynamic for achieving the minimum liquidity ratios.  
Besides the quantitative liquidity requirements established with the  decision on liquidity 
risk management, this regulation has one additional  built-in stabilizer.  It defines the minimum 
liquidity risk management standards that should be applied by all banks in the country.   These 
standards refer to the whole process of identification, measurement, monitoring, and control of 
the liquidity risk, which,  inter alia, requires the appropriate participation of senior management 
and the internal audit function, implementation of efficient bank reporting system, development 
of a contingency plan, and regular (at least annual) liquidity stress testing. 
 
                                                            
30 Thirty-five percent for a concentration level of 30 percent to 50 percent, and 40 percent for a concentration level 
higher than 50 percent. 
31 At the end of 2010, the weighted average of LR180 for the banking system was 1.3 (for denar positions) and 0.7 
(for FX positions). 23 
 
III. Future Challenges 
Cross-border regulation and national regulation  
Although  foreign  owners  are  highly  present  in  the  banking  system,  the  NBRM 
encountered neither serious problems in the introduction and performance of the macroprudential 
regulations nor divergence with home country supervisors.  On the contrary, the cooperation with 
some of the home supervisors  had been elevated in  the previous period, largely through the 
operation of the supervisory colleges established for the banking groups that do business in the 
country.  The topics discussed by the supervisory colleges included financial stability concerns 
and measures undertaken by the home and host supervisors as a crisis response.  Nonetheless, 
there is still a room for improvement of this cooperation.  For some of the existing subsidiaries 
(especially subsidiaries that are considered as immaterial for the banking group), the NBRM has 
not  succeeded  in  establishing  efficient  cooperation  and  exchange  of  data  with  the  home 
supervisor, or the subsidiary was left out of the supervisory colleges.  In addition, as a host 
supervisor, the NBRM is not always adequately included in the various banks’ decision-making 
processes.  The new European Union supervisory architecture should enable the removal of these 
deficiencies, even though this could be verified only after a period of full implementation of the 
new rules. 
Due to the dominant participation of Greek shareholders in the ownership structure of the 
banking  system,  the  NBRM  closely  monitored  the  development  of  the  crisis  in  its  neighbor 
country.  In order to determine some of the potential spillover effects of the sovereign-debt crisis 
in Greece within the country’s banking system, as well as to assess its own resilience to external 
shocks, in March 2010 the NBRM conducted a simulation of deterioration of the creditworthiness 
of  several  types  of  debtors  of  banks  (applying  two  degrees  of  deterioration—moderate  and 
extreme).  
The simulation of credit shock included three types of debtors:  
1.  domestic net exporters to Greece,
32  
2.  domestic firms that hold debt with Greece, and  
3.  Greek entities that hold debt with the country’s banks.  
 
The results of the simulation point to a relatively high resilience of the country’s banks to 
some of the potential negative effects  of the Greek crisis.   Even in  the case of the  extreme 
simulation  (all  clients  migrate  to  the  worst-risk  category),  none  of  the  banks  experience  a 
decrease of the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) below 8 percent. 
 
Unregulated or lightly regulated institutions  
The existence of a  shadow banking system  in  the country is  extremely  limited.   The 
country’s financial system is reasonably supervised, and all relevant financial sectors operate 
under a certain type of regulation.  In addition, it is a bank-centric system.  The dominance of the 
banking sector is evident through all relevant variables: share of total financial assets, number of 
institutions, and percent of GDP.  As a result, the bulk of the lending activities on the domestic 
market are performed by banks and saving houses.  
                                                            
32 These do not include entities whose exports to Greece make up less than 20 percent of their total exports nor 
entities whose debt to banks is more than 400 percent of their net-export to Greece. 24 
 
The leasing companies are the only financial sector that has a somewhat higher share in 
the lending market.    Their  establishment  and operation  are regulated  with  the 2002  Law  on 
Leasing, amended in 2006, 2008 and 2011.  Under this Law, only companies that have acquired 
license from the Ministry of Finance can perform leasing activities.  The procedure for acquiring 
the necessary licenses is to a large extent similar to the one that applies to banks in the country, 
both for licensing of shareholders and licensing of management bodies.  The Ministry of Finance 
is responsible for the supervision of the leasing companies, issuance of corrective measures, and 
withdrawal of the operating license.  The structure of the law and its bylaws represents a solid 
basis for adequate regulatory treatment of the leasing companies, and diminishes the possibility 
of a significant transfer of lending activities from banks to these financial institutions.  The share 
of the leasing companies in the country’s total financial assets verifies this conclusion.  During 
the  period  when  the  NBRM  introduced  its  macroprudential  measures  aimed  at  the  banking 
system (2008 and 2009), the share of the leasing companies remained almost unchanged (around 
3 percent).  
In order to ensure adequate treatment of all financial institutions that might extend loans 
to clients, at the end of 2010 the Law on Financial Companies was adopted by the Parliament.  
The law covers all financial institutions that extend loans, issue credit cards, perform factoring 
activities, or issue guaranties.  These institutions could perform these activities only after the 
receipt of a license issued by the Ministry of Finance.  Again, the licensing procedures follow the 
criteria and the conditions applicable to banks. In addition, the law limits the total lending of 
these institutions to no more than 10 times of their capital and reserves.
33  This new legislation 
provides for an additional prevention of  imprudent behavior by lending institutions that are not 
banks. 
 
Implementation of the new capital requirements (Basel III) 
The discussion on the future challenges would be incomplete without a reflection on the 
implementation of the  reform of the  capital adequacy requirements (the so -called Basel III).  
Immediately after the release of the final document on the global framework for more resilient 
banks and banking system, the NBRM performed an analysis on its impact on banks.  The current 
capital adequacy framework defines the own funds in a more prudent manner than the definition 
outlined  in  the  Basel  II  framework.     According  to  the  decision  on  the  methodology  for 
determining the capital adequacy, Tier 1 capital includes equity capital and reserves and retained 
earnings (including the  current profit, if it fulfills certain prudential filters).    The regulation 
disallows banks to regard any debt instruments (such as the innovative instruments) as Tier 1 
capital, regardless of their capital-like features.  Consequently, the Tier 1 capital defined with the 
current capital adequacy framework is  to  large extent  similar to  the Basel III definition of 
common equity.
34  Hence, expectations are that banks will be able to fulfill the higher capital 
ratios.  
The current level of solvency position of banks in the country confirms these expectations 
(Chart 17).
35  At the end of 2010, the capital adequacy ratio of the banking system equal ed 16.1 
                                                            
33 According to the law, the capital of the financial companies cannot be lower than 100,000 euro. 
34 There are small differences in the manner of calculating the deductable items, but due to  the low share of these 
items in the banks’ capital level, the differences are immaterial. 
35 Due to the close similarities of the common equity and the Tier 1 capital under the  banking system’s capital 
framework, the amount of common equity is not presented separately in the chart. 25 
 
percent.  All banks are above the minimum common equity ratio (4.5 percent), Tier 1 ratio (6.0 
percent), common equity plus conservation buffer ratio (7.0 percent), and total capital adequacy 
ratio (8.0 percent).  Only one bank has a Tier 1 ratio slightly lower than the minimum of 8.5 
percent for the Tier 1 plus conservation buffer, and only one other bank has a ratio that is close to 
that minimum (9 percent).  In addition, all banks in the country have leverage ratios well above 
the Basel III minimum of 3 percent (6.1 percent to 43.6 percent), or a weighted average of 10.3 
percent. 
 




As was illustrated in the introduction, at the end of 2008 the NBRM has quantified the 
acceptable liquidity position of banks.  The two liquidity ratios correspond to a certain degree to 
the liquidity standards defined with Basel III.  There will be a necessity for further calibration of 
the existing LR30 and LR180 with the liquidity coverage ratio and the net stable funding ratio.  
However, the fact that banks are already required to maintain certain levels of liquidity will 
considerably  lessen  the  regulatory  burden  for  adequate  implementation  of  the  new  Basel  III 
liquidity standards. 
 
IV. Conclusions  
It is quite difficult to measure the effectiveness of the macroprudential toolkit employed 
by the NBRM and to isolate its independent impact, since it was undertaken in conjunction with 
other stabilization measures.  In addition, the macroprudential measures are of recent nature, and 
there is still not enough theory and experience worldwide against which to assess contribution.  
Nevertheless, this section attempts to summarize their quantitative and qualitative impact.  The 
quantitative approach measures the impact of the employed macroprudential instruments through 
an assessment of the tendencies of the variables targeted by these instruments.  The qualitative 
approach is focused at identifying and understanding the key experiences and lessons learned by 
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Chart 18. The quantitative impact of the NBRM measures on the banking system 
 
Note: NPL= Nonperforming loans 
Source: NBRM 
 
As  we  have  seen,  the  main  target  of  the  NBRM  measures  were  the  credit  growth 
(especially the growth of the loans to households), the quality  of banks’ credit portfolio, the 
banks’ liquidity position, and the enhancement of the capital adequacy of the banking system.  
The results are rather evident (Chart 18).  Most of the macroprudential measures (three out of 
four) were undertaken in a period of one year, from the first quarter of 2008 till the same period 
in 2009.  In this period, all of the analyzed indicators experienced positive movements; they are 
particularly  apparent  for  the  credit  growth,  both  of  the  overall  portfolio  and  of  the  loans  to 
households.    During  this  one-year  period,  the  annual  growth  rate  of  the  overall  portfolio 
decreased by almost 40 percent, while the loans to households were reduced by 54 percent.  At 
the same time, the liquid-to-total-assets ratio was been elevated by more than half from its lowest 
level at the end of the first quarter of 2009.
36  In addition to the undertaken measures, it should be 
emphasized that the credit growth slowdown was also a result of the negative impact of the 
financial crisis over the domestic economy.  The worsening of the real sector performances, the 
decline of the disposable income of households , and the higher uncertainty had influenced the 
lending practices of banks.    The banks strengthened their credit -granting criteria,  which has 
additionally decreased the amount of loans to the real sector. 
From the analyzed variables, the only indicator that has a diverse path is the share of the 
nonperforming loans (NPL ratio).  This ratio experienced its lowest level right in the mid dle of 
the crisis period (third quarter of 2008)  and its peak  in the post-crisis period (10.6 percent at 
September 2010).  The main reason for this behavior of the amount of NPLs is associated with 
the maturity of the banks’ credit portfolio.  Namely, due to the credit growth, the newly extended 
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loans made a greater contribution to the total credit portfolio.
37  With the aging of the portfolio, 
the amount of NPLs has grown, which  has  had an adverse impact on its share in the total 
portfolio.  However, when analyzing the level of NPLs,  one should bear in mind the level of 
allocated provisions.  During the five years from 2003 to 2007, the annual change of the amount 
of provisions has always been positive, while the amount of NPLs has experienced a slowdown 
(Chart 19).  As a result, in this period banks have built up an excess of provisions over NPLs by 
more than 3.7 billion denar.  This excess provided banks with an adequate buffer, which was used 
during the following three years (2008–2010).  At the end of 2010, the provisions-to-NPLs ratio 
is  still adequate  and  enables full  coverage of the NPLs  with  the allocated provisions  (100.7 
percent). 
Chart 19. Annual change of nonperforming loans (NPLs) and provisions in the pre-crisis, crisis, 




What  were  the  lessons  learned  during  the  implementation  of  the  macroprudential 
measures?  First of all, maybe the most valuable experience was related to the role of the NBRM.  
This central bank established monetary policy and carries out supervisory responsibilities.  In 
addition, beginning from 2006, the NBRM has intensified its duties related to the monitoring of 
financial stability.
38  As a result of the fact that all these tasks are under one roof, the NBRM has 
at its disposal adequate monetary and supervisory data to detect the main vulnerabilities of the 
banking and the financial system and to act accordingly.  The crisis has proven that the efficiency 
of the undertaken measures is largely dependent on the right data and the timely reaction.  
Regardless of these sound preconditions, it was rather challenging to choose the most 
appropriate measures.  First of all, the NBRM, as all other central banks in this period, had little 
                                                            
37  As a reminder, the analysis in the second section of this paper regarding the credit quality of the loan to 
households was performed with the exclusion of new credit exposures. 
38 The NBRM has issued its first Financial Stability Report, which reflects the trends and movements in 2006. With 
the adoption of the new Law on the NBRM (December 2010), financial stability is identified as one of the main 
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experience with the features and the use of macroprudential instruments.  The timing and the 
adequacy of each instrument have proven to be most valuable for its effectiveness.  In addition to 
the chosen measures, the NBRM had discussed several other measures, such as raising minimum 
capital adequacy ratio and limiting lending to certain industries, which could have amplified the 
system’s resilience.  However, the national bank had decided not to use these measures for the 
following reasons: 
1.  Banks in the country already had high capital-adequacy ratios, which had removed the 
systemic feature of this measure;
39 and 
2.  The NBRM was concerned that the quantitative limitation of lending to certain industries 
and sectors might have an adverse impact on the real economy.  
 
Even  though  the  macroprudential  policy  is  not  intended  to  be  fair  to  all  market 
participants and usually requires prompt reaction without enough time to analyze all possible 
impacts, some of the undertaken measures have demonstrated an uneven playing field for the 
banks in the country.  The practice has shown that certain banks were ―punished‖ more than 
others.  Furthermore, in some of these instances, the ―punished‖ banks were less risky than others 
in terms of their influence on the overall banking system.  As a result, some of the banks had 
asked for a replacement of the macroprudential measures with a more micro-based approach.  
Thus, probably the most important lessons that should be drawn for the future are:  
1.  To  develop  a  range  of  possible  macroprudential  tools  for  different  crisis  situations.  
Although it is difficult to predict all probable system-related emergencies, it would be 
reasonably easier if the responsible authority already have some instruments in place that 
could be adequately altered to correspond to the current situation. 
2.  The introduction and implementation of the macroprudential measures requires a more 
persuasive  and  robust  communication  with  the  industry,  to  demonstrate  the  rationale 
behind the undertaken actions, as well as to explain their effectiveness.  
                                                            
39 At the end of the first quarter of 2008, only two banks in the country had capital -adequacy ratios below 12 
percent. Thus the rise of the minimum capital adequacy ratio by 2 to 4 percentage points would have had limited 
impact on the whole system. 